Since 28 September, Booking.com no longer sends the guest's phone number to any PMS or channel manager, in any country. And from 20 November, Airbnb no longer lets hosts ask guests for their phone number, email or home address.


Since 28 September, Booking.com no longer sends the guest's phone number to any PMS or channel manager, in any country. And from 20 November, Airbnb no longer lets hosts ask guests for their phone number, email or home address.
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If you work with a PMS, you have probably noticed: Booking.com reservations arrive without a phone number. So the automated WhatsApp or SMS messages, with the check-in instructions or the door code, have no one to go to.
It looks as if the platforms want to keep the guest to themselves. There is some of that, for sure. But there is something else behind it: scams aimed at guests, built on the real details of their booking.
The guest gets a WhatsApp message that seems to come from their hotel or apartment. It carries their name, the property's name, the check-in and check-out dates and the booking number. All of it is true. The message says the booking needs to be confirmed and sends a link to a page that poses as the property's or as Booking.com's. That is where the guest types in their bank details.
That is the scam described in a security warning from INCIBE, Spain's national cybersecurity institute, on 31 July. And it goes beyond warnings: between April and September, in the Basque Country alone, the regional police (the Ertzaintza) received 98 complaints about it. In total, guests lost more than €57,000.
Booking.com states on its website that it never asks for card details by email, by phone, by text or on WhatsApp. But when a message gets the arrival date and the booking number right, who is going to suspect it? That is why it works.
The Ertzaintza points to three routes: attacks on the booking platform, attacks on property websites, and data bought on sites that sell leaks. And this year's cases touch every link of the chain: the platform, the hotels' accounts and the software we managers use.
| When | Who | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| April 2026 | Booking.com | Confirmed that third parties may have accessed booking data of its guests: name, email, phone number and booking details. |
| May 2026 | Gen Digital, the company behind Norton | Found more than 350 properties in 50 countries whose accounts were in the scammers' hands. |
| September 2026 | HotelNetSolutions, a German channel manager | A flaw in its system let someone access booking data, which was then used in fake messages to guests. It fixed the flaw on 19 September. |
| September 2026 | Temairazu, a Japanese channel manager | From 21 September, guests of the properties that use it received fake messages. Data of up to 4.45 million people may be exposed: name, phone, email, dates and price. |
There is no need to attack Booking.com. Stealing the password of a hotel or a manager is enough.
Bridewell, a cybersecurity firm, explained in June how an attack it has seen since the start of the year works. First comes an email that poses as Booking.com. The link leads to a fake page, where someone on the team types their extranet username and password. With that account, the scammer sees the reservations and writes to the guests on WhatsApp.
And every piece of software we connect keeps the guest's phone number: the extranet, the PMS, the channel manager, the automated messaging tool… The more software, the more places it can leak from.
Booking.com presents it as a security measure to protect guests' phone numbers, and gives no further explanation. The PMS and channel manager companies it notified link it to the fake messages sent over WhatsApp and SMS.
The way I see it, Booking.com cannot control the security of thousands of PMSs, channel managers and passwords. What it does control is which data leaves its own system. And if the phone number never leaves Booking.com, it cannot leak from any PMS or any channel manager.
Booking.com is not the only platform doing this:
Automated WhatsApp or SMS messages no longer go out on new Booking.com reservations. If your check-in instructions went that way, those guests have not received them since 28 September.
You can look up the phone number in the extranet, one reservation at a time. With several arrivals a day, that is manual work that did not exist before.
And on Airbnb, from 20 November, an online check-in that asks the guest for their phone number or email is no longer allowed, outside those exceptions.
I think the platforms will stop giving us the guest's phone number, and will only lend it to us for the length of the stay. Airbnb already does this in the United States and Canada. I would not be surprised if Booking.com ends up doing the same.
Messages with the guest will go through each platform's messaging. And a single stolen password on the team is enough for a scammer to see every reservation.
Less guest data moving through our software is good news. What has to change is the route your check-in instructions take.
At ListingOK we set up and manage the PMS and the platforms of every property we look after. If you want us to review how your Booking.com guests get their check-in instructions today, request a demo.
The phone number no longer arrives. The instructions still have to.

Miguel Roig Gimbernat is Partner at ListingOK, specializing in Revenue Management for vacation rentals and short-term rentals. With over 15 years of experience in technology, pricing, and revenue management, he helps property managers and hosts maximize their profitability on Airbnb and Booking.com through real market data and expert supervision. He combines expertise in data, platforms and technology with marketing to transform market intelligence into revenue decisions that boost profitability.